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COLTEN v. KENTUCKY: DE NOVO REVIEW AND THE PRICE
OF A FAIR TRIAL
Perhaps the peacock has begun to sport a few of its new feathers.
Since Chief justice Warren E. Burger's appointment to the highest
court, one message has become exceedingly clear to the judiciary:
steps must be taken to expedite the overburdened dockets of the
nation's courts1 and to increase the speed and efficiency of the
administration of justice. 2 With this noteworthy ambition no argument is ventured; however, when expediency and efficiency are
attained at the expense of fundamental fairness and justice, the price
must be evaluated scrupulously and the bargain placed in its proper
perspective. Noble goals attained by ignoble means are of dubious
value.
Consideration of two qualities, justice and expediency, was recently
aired before the United States Supreme Court in a challenge to the
Kentucky trial de novo arrangement.3 Unfortunately instead of striving
for an improvement in the quality of justice, the Court settled in
favor of expediency. In Colten v. Kentucky,4 the Supreme Court refused to extend the holding of North Carolina v. Pearce5 to appeals
from Kentucky's inferior courts (which include justice of the peace,
police, municipal, and county courts) to the superior or circuit
courts through the trial de novo. In Pearce the Supreme Court
disallowed the imposition of a harsher sentence upon a defendant
after a new trial unless there appeared affirmatively in the trial
record ample justification based upon objective information and factual
data concerning identifiable conduct occurring in the time lapse
between the original trial and the new trial.6 Although the decision
in Colten is limited to the de novo process as exercised in Kentucky,
some twenty states7 use a similar arrangement and can be assumed to
be affected.
1 Interview with Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, U.S.
voaR, December 14, 1970, at 35.
Id.at 39-40.
z Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
AId.
5 395 U.S. 711 (1969).

NEWs & WORLD RE-

0 Id. at 726.

7 See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-371 et seq. (1956); ARx. STAT. ANN. §§
44-501 et seq. (1964 Repl. Vol.); COLO. RuLEs CluM. Pnoc. 37(f) (1963); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 932-52 et seq. (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-713 et seq. (1971);
KAN.STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3610 et seq. (Cum.Supp. 1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

15, § 2112 (Cum. Supp. 1972); MD.ANN. CODE art. 5, § 43 (1968 Repl. Vol.);
MicH. STATE ANN. §§ 28-1226 et seq. (Cum.Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. §§ 488.20,
633.20 et seq. (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 1201,.1202 (Supp. 1971); Mo. Sur. CT.
(Continued on next page)
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Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority, indicates that the
inital reason for not applying Pearce to the trial de novo is that "the
hazards of being penalized for seeking a new trial, which underlay
8
the holding of Pearce" does not inhere in the trial de novo. As commentators and judges have noted, the Pearce holding was necessary
"to free all defendants from the fear, whether real or imagined, that
they will be penalized for initiating postconviction proceedings."' In
addition, it has been noted that due process requires the protection
of the defendant who exercises his right and the elimination of the
chilling and deterring effect such a possibility has on the unrestrained
exercise of this right.10 It is contended herein that the Court erred
in not extending the Pearceholding to appeals from Kentucky's inferior
courts by trial de novo for two principal reasons. First, precisely the
same dangers to the defendant are inherent in the trial de novo as in
the Pearce case; in both there is a possibility of increased penalty
through vindictive sentencing and, simultaneously, a chilling effect
on the exercise of a given right from the presence of that possibility.
Second, there is no material distinction between a Pearce-type case
and a trial de novo; both involve new trials granted after an appeal
process by the state. Concurrently, it is contended herein that the
Court's concern for expediency rather than for a better quality of
justice promulgated the error.
Appellate review has never been required of the states; nonetheless,
once provided, a state must not deny a constitutional guarantee as the
price for its exercise:"
The court was without right to ...put a price on an appeal. A

defendant's exercise of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered.... [Ilt is unfair to use the great power given to the court
to determine sentence to 12place a defendant in the dilemma of
making an unfree choice.

Kentucky provides a statutory right of appeal to the circuit court for
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

RULE 22 (Cum.Supp. 1973); MONT. REV. CoDES ANN. HS 95-2001 et seq. (1967 Repl;
Vol.); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-601 et seq. (1971); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 189.010 et

seq. (1968); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 502.18, 502A:11-12 et seq., 20-138 (1965);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 33-12-40 et seq. (1960); PA. CONST. SCHFrD. ART. 5, 16(r)

(iii) TEx. CODE CGlm. PROC. arts. 44.17, 45.10 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. §§
16.1-129 et seq. (1960 Repl. Vol.); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3.50.380 et seq.
(Supp. 1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-1 et seq. (1966).
8Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
0 Comment, 24 Aim. L. REv. 117, 118 (1970).
10 Comment, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 286, 292 (1969).

See also Note, Another
Look at UnconstitutionalConditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968).
11 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1962); Griflfin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 18 (1955).
t2Worcester v. Comm'r, 370 F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1966).
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persons convicted in the inferior courts. 13 By statutory requirement,
that appeal must be through a trial de novo regardless of the type of
error on which the defendant seeks review. 14 Within the jurisdiction
of these lower, informal courts are crimes punishable by a maximum
sentence of 12 months imprisonment and a maximum fine of $500 or
both. 15 In practice, choice of forum in offenses falling within this
category is often at the discretion of the arresting officer who assigns
the forum at the time of the arrest.
A not atypical encounter with an inferior court involves a hearing
before a judge who has little or no formal legal education, sitting
without the presence of a jury (unless specifically requested by the
defendant), with no record being made. Often the entire matter is
completed within a matter of moments, which is frequently the same
amount of time counsel, if requested, has had to prepare his case for
the proceeding. It is no wonder that the defendant is often left
frustrated, frightened, and indubitably questioning the integrity of
the judicial process. 16 Ordinarily the defendant feels more like he
has been trapped in a revolving door than in a court of justice.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has recognized that the state's
inferior courts are hardly equipped to insure a constitutionally fair
trial:
Under our system of justice the inferior courts are not designed or

equipped to conduct error-free trials, or to insure full recognition
of constitutional freedoms. They are courts of convenience, to pro-

vide speedy
and inexpensive means of dispositions of minor
17
offenses.

In other words, Kentucky-frequently at the discretion of an arresting
officer-forces a person to stand trial in a court admittedly a notch
below constitutional standards' s and then makes him sustain the risk
of an augmented sentence for requesting his constitutional right to a
fair trial. The defendant, perhaps less impressed with the fairness of
his trial than its brevity, is given the "grisly choice" 19 of abandoning
his constitutional right to a fair trial and serving his sentence (which,
regardless of the severity, may mean a criminal record for the rest of
his life) or exercising that right under the hazard, should he be reconKy. REv. STAT. § 23.032 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
14 Ky.R. Cum. P. 12.02, 12.06 (1972).
1s

15 KRS §§ 25.010, 26.010 (1971).
16 See Hasler, De Novo Jbries, Misdemeanor Counsel and other Problems:
Changes
Ahead for the Maine DistrictCourts?, 23 U. ME. L. REv. 63, 93 (1971).
1T Colten v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Ky. 1971).
189 Id.at 379.
2 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440 (1963).
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victed, of an increased sentence. The injustice inherent in such a
system is readily apparent:
[A]n accused is being required to relinquish his right to a fair trial
in order to secure the privilege of the sentence first pronounced.
To compel a defendant to waive this right is plainly inconsistent
with the desired ends of our legal system. The right to a fair trial
is fundamental. Without it our system expires. By permitting
at the second trial the state is clearly qualifying
stiffer sentences
20
that right.
Another area of danger involved in not applying Pearce to trials
de novo is not as readily apparent. It has been said that the law is
21
The
not tidy but is as unkempt as the life with which it deals.
come
not
do
they
problems;
legal
of
same is true of the analysis
compartmentalized but instead are intertwined, gnarled, and knotty.
Enmeshed with the possible due process problems of allowing harsher
penalties after appeals by a trial de novo is the chilling effect such a
possibility has on the right to appeal. Other prisoners, considering
whether to appeal through the de novo process, will be dissuaded by
harsher penalties, and any factor which inhibits free exercise of a constitutional right effectively limits that right. As Professor Van Alstyne
has noted, the fact that exercising the right to appeal can and does
mean increased penalties is a fact that will not be lost on other
prisoners. 22 Clearly the price of exposure to a greater penalty may
be more than a defendant is willing to pay in asserting his rights. The
presence of such a risk restrains those who would otherwise attempt
to vindicate alleged wrongs and suppressed rights. 23 Realizing the
inherent dangers of augmented sentences after new trial and the
general impairment such a possibility has on the judicial process, the
American Bar Association has flatly opposed such a practice:
[I]n light of the constitutional concerns and the probably deterrent
effects if increased sentences are imposed... the original sentence
should 24operate as a ceiling in cases where a new conviction is obtained.
A second distinction the Court draws between a Colten situation,
involving an increase in penalty after an appeal through a trial de
2

o Honigsburg, Limitations Upon Increasinga Defendant's Sentence Following
a Successful Appeal and Reconviction, 4 CrM. L. BuLL. 329, 333 (1968).
21 F. FRANKFURTER, REMINISCES 21 (1960).
22Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful"

Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 609 (1965).
23 See Comment, supra note 10, at 292.
24See ABA PRoJEcT ON MINIMUM STANDARnS

FOR CRIVNAL JUSTICE: STAN-

DARDS RELATING TO POST CONVICTION REEIES

§ 6.3, Comment C (Approved

Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as POST CONVICTION REM.DIES].

1973]

CoMvFMrS

novo, and a Pearce case, involving an increase in penalty after an
appeal and a subsequent trial, is that the de novo review "represents
a completely fresh determination of guilt or innocence. It is not an
appeal from the record." 25 Several problems arise with this rationale.
First, it is virtually impossible to delineate the Court's rather feeble
distinction between a Pearce-type case where a defendant's original
conviction has been set aside-either by appeal or collateral proceeding-and a new trial ordered, and a case where the defendant has
appealed his original conviction and received a trial de novo. In both
cases a new trial and a redetermination of guilt are involved; moreover, in both cases the misconduct to be punished is the same.26 The
differentiation, rather than rational, appears to be a mirage of words
which could best be cured by application of the concurring opinion
of Justices Douglas and Marshall in Pearce: "[I]f for any reason a new
trial is granted and there is a conviction a second time, the second
penalty imposed cannot exceed the first penalty .... ,,27
Infatuated with the concept of a fresh determination, the Court
indulges itself in a second fallacy: the trial de novo is a fresh
determination; therefore, the defendant "consents" to a whole new
trial including a possible harsher penalty. As in Pearce, however, it is
a redetermination of guilt and the guarantee of a fair trial which are
at issue here, and, as has been noted, for a court to declare that a
defendant who predicates a "constitutional right to petition for a fair
trial on the fiction that he has consented to a possible harsher
punishment offends the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."28
Since there is no material distinction between the Pearce and de
novo situations and since in either case to allow harsher penalties is to
expose the defendant to unnecessary hazards for exercising an appeal,
Pearce should apply. If it is not applied, under the de novo arrangement the state deprives the accused of his constitutional right to a fair
trial by trying him in a court which the state admits is below constitutional standards and then dares him to assert his right by threatening him with the risk of augmented punishment.2 9
A third and rather fragile distinction which the Court proffers for
not applying Pearce to trials de novo centers on the fact that the
second trial occurs in a new court. The same court is not being "asked
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972).
Torrance v. Henry, 304 F. Supp. 725, 726 (E.D.N.C. 1969).
North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726-27 (1969).
28
Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 639 (4th Cir. 1967).
20 Id. at 640.
25

26
27
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30
to do what it thought it had done correctly." What difference it makes
whether the same or a new court imposes the harsher sentence remains
obscure. If the Court believes that vindictiveness is left behind as the
appellant moves to a higher court for the trial de novo, then it should
be reminded that vindictiveness is not confined to one courtroom or
one judge. Merely because the trial de novo occurs in a new court
does not end the danger the Court was attempting to quell in Pearce.
The danger is not in which court has the possibility of inflicting the
harsher punishment; the danger lies in the deterrent effect such a possibility has on the appeal process. 3' If Pearce was aimed at liberating
the defendant from judicial vindictiveness and the fear thereof, it
clearly needs application to the trial de novo.
A final distinction between Colten and Pearce tendered by the
Court is "[t]he possibility of vindictiveness, found to exist in Pearce
is not inherent in the Kentucky two-tier system." 32 Presumably since
a different court from the inferior court imposes the second sentence,
the probability that an augmented penalty has resulted from vindictiveness is eliminated. 33 It must be remembered, however, that improper
34
motivation for inflicting harsher penalties is a "force of low visibility"
and is, therefore, difficult to detect and eliminate. In Pearce the Court
concluded that the only way to avoid vindictive sentencing was to
require:

that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective infor-

mation concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And
the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must
be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of

the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal. 35
Since new trials granted after an appeal process provided by the state
are involved in both Pearce and Colten, the safeguards required for
one should be equally applicable to the other.
If the belief in a lower probability of vindictiveness derives from
the notion that the new court will not be aware of the proceedings in
the lower court, it fails to take into account the vicissitudes of Ken30

Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972).
v. Ross, 434 F.2d 297, 299 (4th Cir. 1970). See also Alpine, Sentence
Increases on Retrial After North Carolinav. Pearce, 39 U. C. L. REv. 427, 436
(1970).
32 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
33 See Alpine, supra note 31, at 456.
34 Patton v. Nort Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1967).
35 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711. 726 (1969).
31 Wood

CoMMErs
tucky court life in which, more often than not, the lower court judge
and the circuit court judge share the same building, the same staircases
and elevators, and often even the same coffee machine. Likewise no
definable reason explains why "Circuit Court judges cannot be as
vindictive towards defendants who encumber their courts with trials
for de novo review as they can be toward those who encumber their
courts with retrials resulting from reversals or remand orders."3 6
Additionally it should be noted that judges, who are elected officials,
are not immune in their austerity from feeling political pressures. To
extend Professor Wechsler's observation that heavy sanctions for
certain crimes are often the result of political notation of sudden
public interest rather than logical analysis, 37 it would not seem unreasonable to believe it possible that a sudden and dramatic increase
in a defendant's penalty before an elected judge might be the result
of an attempt to communicate a stand on law and order to an interested
electorate.
To prevent such an appearance or possibility, whether involving
a trial de novo or an appeal from the record, "the fixed policy must
necessarily be that the new sentence shall not exceed the old."38 Such
an action has been found to be the sole guarantee against allegations
of improper conduct 39 and against even the appearance of improper
motivation which, working alone, can cast a shadow of mistrust over
the administration of justice.40 Such a rule is not a nonentity or even
a rarity; it has been adopted in the Uniform Code of Military Justice,42
has been proposed by the American Bar Association,42 and is used in
at least one foreign court.43 Two additional reasons beyond the Pearce
distinctions already noted permeate the rationale for not limiting
sentences on de novo review: one is the expediency of the de novo
courts, and the other is the fear that restraining circuit courts from
increasing penalties would, in effect, cause the inferior courts to
invoke more severe sentences. The latter smacks of the lowest opinion
of an inferior court judge, regarding him as an ogre who disseminates
sentences without regard to purpose or justification. It is to be hoped
36 Brief for Appellant at 42, Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
3 Wechsler, sentencing Correctionsand the Model Penal Coe 109 U. PA. L.

472-73 (1961).
REv. 3465,
8

Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1967).

30 See Coinment, supra note 10, at 29'5. See generally Brief for Respondent at
29-31, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
40 Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1967).
411 0 U.S.C. § 863b (1970).
42See PosT CONVICTION REMEDIES, supra note 24, and ABA litojEcr ON
MINIMU

STANDARDS

FOR CnnInlqAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES

PRnocEunEs § 3.8 (Tentative Draft 1967).
43 Strafprozessordnung (GERMAN CODE OF CmnU,L PROCEDURE)

358(2) (1965).

AND

§§ 331(1),
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that such is not the case now nor would it be should Pearce be applied
universally to new trials. If such a practice should occur, legislative
action could remedy the problem. It must be realized also that invoking unjust penalties would have an adverse effect on the state's
interest in maintaining the inferior courts as courts of convenience.
Instead of deterring appeals, relieving the crowded superior court
docket, and cutting rising judicial costs, it would cause an increase in
the number of appeals, a more crowded docket, and consequently
greater expense.
Recognition by the Court that the informal inferior court trial is
an expedient and economical means of administering justice is commendable. The Court's willingness, however, to permit this expediency
and consciousness of economy to dampen the right to appeal without
the risk of an increase in penalty is unfortunate. It is conceded, with
some reluctance, that the right to appeal is not an absolute right and
that legitimate state procedures which merely chill the right must be
tolerated; 44 nevertheless the threat of a harsher penalty which deters
not only a statutory right to appeal but also the constitutional right to
a fair trial is wholly inconsistent with legitimate interests. Even in
economic terms it certainly is not persuasive for a state to maintain
that the monetary costs or the costs in time and personnel of entertaining postconviction proceedings justifies such an unfair and eccentric
means of cutting costs and relieving court congestion, 45 especially
since there is no evidence that costs have risen noticeably in those
jurisdictions which currently forbid harsher sentencing. 40 Similarly,
if underlying the allowance of the deterrent effect of more severe
sentences is the pervasive fear that otherwise the already overburdened
superior courts would be engulfed in frivolous appeals, the Court
merely looked too long and too fondly at expediency and failed to take
notice of the evidence. Contrary to the landslide theory, those court
systems, states and countries which have forbidden increased penalties
have noted no significant evidence of undue burdens on the courts
because of the practice. 47
As a final note, it must be realized that a deterrent effect is indiscriminate, affecting meritorious as well as frivolous appeals. In that
the danger lies. Surely the expediency of a possible unfair trial does
44 U.S. v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 843 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Comment, 83
HAnv.L. REv. 187, 192 (1969).
45 See Van Alstyne, supranote 22, at 618. See also Comment, 1965 DuKE L.J.
395, 401.
46
See Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 618 n.33.

47 1d.
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not outweigh the deleterious effect such a system has on an individual
seeking a fair and just adjudication of his case. To have extended
Pearce to trials de novo might have curtailed the expediency of the
system to some extent, but not to have extended Pearce placed expediency before fairness and justice on the value scale-an unfortunate
price.
Ronald L Gaffney

